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THE HOT CARGO CLAUSE AND ITS EFFECT UNDER
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
Labor union A, the collective bargaining representative of the em-
ployees of company Y, is engaged in a dispute with that company, and
is on strike. Labor union B is the representative of employees of
company Z, which normally handles, transports, or utilizes the prod-
uct of company Y in its business operations. Upon receiving notice of
the strike being waged by union A, union B instructs its members not
to handle company Y's product. Thereafter, until the termination of
the dispute between Y and A, the members of B do not work with Y's
product.
Under the above facts, union B would clearly be guilty of an unfair
labor practice, under section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) , which, according to its chief
proponent, outlawed the "secondary boycott."3 However, the char-
acter of union B's conduct under the Taft-Hartley Act becomes less
clear when the collective bargaining contract between union B and
company Z contains a clause such as the following:
Members of the Union reserve the right to refuse to handle
goods from any firm which is engaged in any controversy with
this or any other Union.
Commonly called a hot cargo clause,4 the effect and validity of collec-
tive bargaining contracts containing such clauses,5 in regard to the
1. See Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S.
707 (1951); International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
2. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
3. Senator Taft, during debate, declared: "So we have so broadened the pro-
vision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice."
93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
4. E.g., NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 241
F.2d 147, 153 (9th Cir.) cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957); Rabouin v. NLRB,
195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1952).
5. The quotation in the text is based upon the contract provision in the Con-
way's Express case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 87 N.L.R.B.
972, 981 (1949), enforcement granted sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906
(2d Cir. 1952). Other hot cargo provisions read as follows:
"It shall not be a violation of this contract and it shall not be cause for dis-
charge if any employee or employees refuse to go through the picket line of a
union or refuse to handle unfair goods. Nor shall the exercise of any rights
permitted by law be a violation of this contract.
"The terms 'unfair goods' as used in this Article includes, but is not limited
to, any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled, or used by any
carrier, whether party to this agreement or not, at whose terminal or terminals
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
legality of union conduct otherwise proscribed by section 8(b)
(4) (A), have been a subject of controversy in the courts and the
NLRB for several years. This controversy has led to conflicting de-
cisions among the courts and members of the Board. As a result of
this conflict, four hot cargo cases are now before the Supreme Court
on certiorari.0 It is the purpose of this note to present and analyze
the various positions taken on the validity of these clauses, to point
out the difficulties inherent in the adoption of any of these positions
by the Supreme Court, and to submit a preferred course of decision.
The facts presented in each of the cases to be discussed are, unless
otherwise noted, substantially identical to the facts hypothesized in
the first paragraph. For the purposes of this note, the term "primary
employer" will be used to indicate an employer in the position of
company Y in that hypothetical situation; the term "primary em-
ployees" will be used to indicate the employees of company Y; the
term "secondary employer" will be used to indicate company Z; and
"secondary employees" will be used to indicate the employees of com-
pany Z. "Secondary boycott" will be used to designate the conduct of
the employees of company Z in refusing to work with the products of
company y.7 "Unfair goods" will be used to describe the products of
company Y.8
or place or places of business there is a controversy between such carrier or its
employees on the one hand, and a labor union on the other hand; and such goods
or equipment should continue to be 'unfair' while being transported, handled or
used by interchanging or succeeding carriers, whether parties to this Agreement
Dr not, until such controversy is settled." United Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL,
110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 1775 (1954).
"Workmen shall not be required to handle nonunion material." Local 1976,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1214 (1955), enforce-
ment granted sub nom. NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
AFL, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three of the cases on October 14,
1957: Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 355 U.S.
808 (1957); NLRB v. General Drivers, AFL-CIO, 355 U.S. 808 (1957); Local
850, International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
Petition for certiorari was filed August 29, 1957, in NLRB v. Milk Drivers,
AFL-CIO, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (No. 412).
7. "Secondary boycott" is a phrase most difficult to pin down. Judge Learned
Hand has defined it as follows: "The gravemen of a secondary boycott is that its
sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but
upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to
stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce the employer
to give in to his employees' demands." International Brotherhood of Elece.
Workers, AFL v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2nd Cir. 1950).
For a discussion of NLRB policy in enforcing § 8(b) (4) (A), see Koretz,
Evaluating Board Policy and Precedent-Some Areas of Policy Change Under
the "New" NLRB, New York University Seventh Annual Conference on Labor
143, 152-57 (1954).
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The Taft-Hartley Act declares that it is an unfair labor practice
for a labor union or its agents
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans-
port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, mate-
rials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any ... employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other-
wise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son .... 9
The first interpretation of this section of the Taft-Hartley Act in a
hot cargo case was given by the NLRB in Conway's Express case.10
The Board majority held that a hot cargo clause constituted advance
consent by the secondary employer not to deal with or use the prod-
ucts of any unfair employer. The secondary employees, therefore,
were not engaged in a "strike" or "refusal to work" when they would
not handle unfair goods.11 The Board also reasoned that because the
secondary employer had given his advance contractual consent, the
union conduct could not be said to be "forcing or requiring" him to
cease doing business with the primary employer. 2 Holding that the hot
cargo clause was not void as being repugnant to the policy of the act,
the Board stated that the act did not restrict the freedom of an em-
ployer to do business with any firm or person he might choose, and
that a contract governing future business relationships was there-
fore valid. 1" Thus the Board found there had been no violation of the
Taft-Hartley Act.14 This decision was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, which in substance followed the reason-
ing of the Board."5
In McAllister's Transfer case, 1 two other views were expressed by
the Board. While the two dissenting members adhered to the rationale
8. The question what constitutes "unfair" goods, or an "unfair" company
seems never to have arisen. For the purposes of this note, unfair goods are con-
sidered goods which have been manufactured, transported, or processed by a
company which is engaged in a labor dispute with either its employees or a union
seeking recognition. The company so engaged is an unfair company.
9. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1952).
10. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949),
enforcement granted sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
11. 87 N.L.R.B. at 982.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 983.
15. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1952).
16. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
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of Conway's Express case, 17 two of the three members comprising the
majority declared that the hot cargo clause was void.' s Citing con-
gressional debate, they said that section 8 (b) (4) (A) prohibited all
secondary boycotts in order to protect the interest of the public as
well as for the benefit of secondary and primary employers, and that
this statutory protection of the public could not be waived in a private
contract.' A third view was expressed by Board Chairman Farmer.
While concurring in the majority finding that the secondary em-
ployees' union had committed an unfair labor practice, Farmer none-
theless agreed with the dissenters that a hot cargo clause itself was
valid.20 In reaching his decision, Farmer distinguished the facts be-
fore him from the facts of the Conway's Express case. In the latter
case, the secondary employer had acquiesced in the boycott,21 but in
McAllister's Transfer case the secondary employers had posted notices
to the secondary employees directing them to accept and handle the
goods of the primary employer.2 2 Chairman Farmer thereby found
that the secondary employees had "refused" to work, and so held the
union guilty of an unfair labor practice in inducing the secondary
employees to boycott in the face of the secondary employer's direc-
tions to the contrary.23
In the Sand Door and Plywood Co. case, 24 a majority of the Board
stated that it was following Chairman Farmer's reasoning 5 and held
that a union committed an unfair labor practice when it approached
secondary employees and induced or encouraged them to boycott un-
fair goods.2 6 The element of non-acquiescence by the secondary em-
ployer, essential in Chairman Farmer's opinion in McAllister's Trans-
fer case, was not mentioned however. The majority relied solely on
the fact that the union had approached secondary employees instead
of the secondary employer.2 7
None of these three views of the hot cargo-secondary boycott prob-
lem has received consistent support from either the NLRB or the
courts. One year prior to the McAllister's Transfer decision, the
17. Id. at 1790.
18. Id. at 1786.
19. Id. at 1777-86.
20. Id. at 1788-90.
21. 87 N.L.R.B. at 982.
22. 110 N.L.R.B. at 1773-74.
23. Id. at 1790.
24. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 113 N.L.R.B. 1210
(1955), enforcement granted, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S.
808 (1957).
25. 113 N.L.R.B. at 1216 n.20.
26. Id. at 1217.
27. See id. at 1223 (dissenting opinion).
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Board adhered to its Conway's Express decision, 2 and had added an-
other reason for its ruling: Because of the hot cargo clause in their
contract, the handling of unfair goods was, the Board said, excluded
from the course of employment of the secondary employees.29 In 1957,
however, three years after the Board decision in the McAllister's
Transfer case, this was the view taken by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in reversing an NLRB finding that two unions
had been guilty of unfair labor practices.30 Meanwhile the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered enforcement of the Sand Door
and Plywood Co. decision, approving both the reasoning and the re-
sult, i.e., that a union may not, despite a valid hot cargo clause, in-
duce or encourage the secondary employees to boycott.- In 1956,32
the Board followed its decision in the Sand Door and Plywood Co.
case. But in the recent Genuine Parts Co. case,33 the Board moved
back toward the majority opinion in McAllister's Transfer case, hold-
ing that a hot cargo clause is void. One member held the clause to
be void no matter what the business activity of the employer,34 while
the two other members of the majority limited their decision to cases
in which the secondary employer was a common carrier.3 5 The latter
two reasoned that a carrier by a hot cargo clause could not bargain
away its duty under the Interstate Commerce Act to serve all persons
without preference or discrimination36 The view that the clause is
void in itself has not received appellate court approval, but two dis-
trict courts have recognized it. 3'
The present imbroglio regarding the hot cargo clause leaves its
status indeterminable, but the authority supporting the various posi-
28. Chauffeurs Union, 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953) (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.)
29. Id. at 744.
30. Milk Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957),
petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1957) (No. 412).
31. NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL-CIO 241
F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. granted 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
32. General Drivers Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956) (American Iron and
Machine Works Co.), enforcement granted in part, denied in part, 247 F.2d. 71
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
33. Truck Drivers Union, AFL-CIO, 41 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1087 (119 N.L.R.B.
No. 53) (Nov. 8, 1957).
34. 41 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1087, 1094-97.
35. Id. at 1087-94.
36. Id. at 1091-92. These members of the NLRB cited the report of a trial
examiner for the Interstate Commerce Commission in Galveston Truck Line Corp.
v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc. (MC-C-1922). The ICC then cited the NLRB Genuine
Parts Co. decision in its decision in the Galveston Truck Line case on December
16, 1957.
37. Alpert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, 143 F. Supp. 371
(D. Mass. 1956) ; Humphrey v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL, 25 L.R.R.M. 2318 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum).
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tions may be summarized as follows: (1) The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit views the clause: (a) as advance consent to a boy-
cott by the secondary employer-this rationale removing the element
of insubordination from the secondary employees' conduct, and pre-
cluding a finding that the union is attempting to force or coerce a
boycott; and (b) as taking the unfair goods out of the secondary
employees' course of employment. Thus union encouragement to boy-
cott unfair goods under a hot cargo clause does not constitute an un-
fair labor practice in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.3 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia follows this reasoning in
regard to the conduct of the secondary employees' union, but holds
that the hot cargo clause cannot be raised as a defense by a primary
employees' union charged with inducing a secondary boycott. " (2)
A majority of the NLRB now views the hot cargo clause as void, at
least where the secondary employer is a common carrier subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act.4 0 (3) The Courts of Appeals for the
38. Milk Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817 (2d. Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1957) (No. 412); Rabouin v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d. Cir. 1952).
39. General Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir.)
(American Iron and Machine Works Co.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
Briefly, the facts of this case are as follows: The union representing the
primary employees, who were striking against the primary employer, and the
union representing the secondary employees, both appealed to the secondary em-
ployees to refuse to handle the primary employer's product, under the secondary
employees' hot cargo contract. In ruling upon each case (the NLRB found each
union guilty of an unfair labor practice), the three judges divided three ways:
one judge adopted the Board decision and reasoning, which followed the Board
decision in the Sand Door and Plywood Co. case, ruling that both unions had
committed an unfair labor practice; one judge accepted the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (see text at note 38 supra), and voted to re-
verse the Board decision with respect to each union; the third judge adopted the
reasoning of the second judge in regard to the secondary employees' union, but
held that the primary employees' union had committed an unfair labor practice
on the ground that, as it was neither a party to nor a third party beneficiary of
the hot cargo contract, the primary employees' union could not raise the contract
as a defense.
The decision of the third judge would seem to be logically untenable. If, be-
cause he has advance consent to boycott by signing a hot cargo contract, the
secondary employer cannot legally be "forced" or "required" to boycott the
primary employer, one of the elements necessary for a violation of the act is
missing, no matter which union is attempting to induce a boycott. The hot cargo
clause is apparently viewed as a "defense" to a charge of an unfair labor practice.
For a criticism of this point of view, see Milk Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
245 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (U.S.
Aug. 29, 1957) (No. 412).
40. See text at notes 33-36 supra.
41. NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, 241
F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957); NLRB v. Local 11,
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Sixth and Ninth Circuits regard the hot cargo clause as valid in it-
self, but hold that a union may not, under the clause, appeal directly
to secondary employees in order to achieve a boycott.41
Each of these three views can be persuasively supported. The first
is, of course, most favorable to organized labor. Its proponents argue
that, having signed a collective bargaining contract containing a hot
cargo clause, the secondary employer is no longer an innocent party
-he has voluntarily involved himself in the labor disputes of other
employers with whom he might do business. 42 Section 8(b) (4) (A)
was enacted, it is said, not for the public interest, but for the protec-
tion of innocent third parties such as the secondary employer.43 Any
public interest there may be in preventing boycotts lies in the lack of
warning normally attendant to boycotts; in hot cargo cases, the con-
tract itself has given the public warning of possible work stoppages. 4
In addition, proponents of this view may point to two unsuccessful at-
tempts to outlaw the hot cargo clause by amendment of the Taft-
Hartley Act.4 5 Adoption of this view by the Supreme Court would
remove from a union's conduct the elements necessary to an unfair
labor practice under the act, thus permitting any union, capable of
achieving a contract containing a hot cargo clause, to boycott unfair
goods.
It is submitted that the reasoning supporting the first view is logi-
cally sound, with the exception of the constructions placed on the
clauses and the statutory phrase "in the course of their employ-
ment."4 6 To construe a hot cargo clause as excluding unfair work
from the secondary employees' course of employment is to give a
most liberal construction to the contract terminology and a most re-
strictive interpretation to the words of the act. A perusal of typical
hot cargo clauses4 7 indicates that they do not prohibit the handling
of unfair goods but merely reserve a right under which an employee
may refuse to handle such goods. A more realistic interpretation of
the statutory phrase has been adopted by the Board, viz., that the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, 242 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1957)
(dictum).
42. See Milk Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1957) (No. 412).
43. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769,
1792-93 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (McAllister's Transfer case).
44. See Milk Drivers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817, 820 (2d. Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L. Week 3077 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1957) (No. 412).
45. S. 2989, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954) (see 100 Cong. Rec. 6125 (1954)); S.
3842, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (see 102 Cong. Rec. 8021 (1956)). Apparently
both of these bills died in committee.
46. See text at note 29 supra.
47. See note 5 supra.
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phrase was inserted in the act to distinguish between an individual's
status as an employee and as a consumer.48 The basic weakness of
the overall reasoning is its assumption that the public interest in
preventing boycotts is slight enough to be subordinated to the private
contract.49 If this view should be adopted by the Supreme Court, how-
ever, three additional problems could arise. First, if, because of its
contract, the union is not forcing or coercing an employer to boycott
by refusing to work, it can well be argued that a strike to achieve a
contract containing a hot cargo clause would violate the Taft-Hartley
Act because the employer would not have agreed in advance to boy-
cott, and his employees, at the urging of their union, are striking to
force him to give advance consent °0 Second, this view raises the
problem met in the American Iron and Machine Works Co.51 case:
may a primary employees' union picket the business of a secondary
employer to encourage secondary employees to boycott the primary
employer's goods, where the hot cargo clause is in the secondary em-
ployees' contract? 2 The third problem is the dilemma presented when
the secondary employer is a common carrier. Under the hot cargo
clause in his labor contract, the secondary employer has consented in
advance to boycott unfair goods; however, should his employees in-
stitute a boycott, he might be subject to penalties under the Interstate
Commerce Act.53
This last problem is largely responsible for the present view held
by some members of the NLRB-that the hot cargo clause is void, at
least where the secondary employer is a common carrier.54 Assuming
that a common carrier would violate the Interstate Commerce Act
should his employees institute a boycott under a hot cargo clause,
voiding the clause appears to be the only practical solution. The
public interest, as expressed in both the Taft-Hartley Act and the
Interstate Commerce Act, would not then be subordinated to the col-
lective bargaining contract. A majority of the NLRB, however, has
never taken the position that hot cargo clauses are void regardless
48. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 113 N.L.R.B. 1210,
1217 (1955) (Sand Door and Plywood Co. case), enforcement granted, 241 F.2d
147 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
49. See text at notes 43-44 supra.
50. In the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case, the Board majority specifically
reserved a ruling on this point. 105 N.L.R.B. 740, 744 n.6 (1953). See also Note,
64 Yale L.J. 1201, 1205 (1955).
51. General Drivers Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956), enforcement granted in
part, denied in part, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 808 (1957).
52. See note 39 supra.
53. See text at notes 35-36 supra.
54. Ibid.
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of the business activity of the secondary employer.5 5 To so hold would
be to stretch the language of the Taft-Hartley Act to encompass state-
ments by members of Congress made during debate on the act. It is
clear that the proponents and opponents of the act both understood
that the purpose of section 8 (b) (4) (A) was to proscribe all second-
ary boycotts,3 but it is equally clear that the primary source from
which to determine congressional intent is the language of the act
itself.
Considering the problem as strictly one of statutory interpretation,
the rationale of the third view-that the clause itself is valid, but does
not authorize a direct appeal by either union to the secondary employ-
ees to effectuate a boycott-appears to be most responsive to the
words of the act.r7 If a union enforces the hot cargo clause in its
collective bargaining contract by direct appeal to the secondary em-
ployees, it may fairly be presumed that the secondary employer is
unwilling to participate voluntarily in the desired boycott. Thus, it
cannot be said that the secondary employees are not "striking" or
"refusing to work," or that the secondary employer is not being
"forced" or "required" to cease doing business with another person.
The union would therefore be guilty of an unfair labor practice.
Adoption of this position by the Supreme Court would raise a serious
problem, however. The clause itself, valid under this view, is in effect
a promise by the secondary employer to participate in future boycotts.
No restriction is placed upon a union's appeals to the secondary em-
ployer to perform his promise to boycott unfair goods by the Taft-
Hartley Act. Should the secondary employer refuse such a request,
he has breached his collective bargaining contract. But appealing to
the employer is the only means of enforcing hot cargo clauses per-
mitted by the Taft-Hartley Act. What remedy, then, is available to
the union for this breach of contract? It is questionable whether an
action for damages would be permitted.5 s Since the union may not,
under this view, approach the secondary employees directly, and a
secondary employer may with impunity refuse union appeals to him,
the only way in which a hot cargo clause might accomplish a boycott
would be for each secondary employee to refuse, individually and
without any union encouragement or inducement, to handle unfair
55. Since the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case, the Board has had difficulty
obtaining a majority for any one rationale regarding hot cargo cases. See,
generally, analysis of Board positions at 41 Lab. Rel. Rep. 9 (1957).
56. See debate between Senators Pepper and Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 4323 (1947).
57. See Note, 64 Yale L.J. 1201 (1955).
58. See Note, 64 Yale L.J. 1201, 1204-05 (1955). But see 7Q. Harv. L. Rev.
735, 736 (1957).
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goods-a situation which would be wholly unreal.59 The effect of this
interpretation of the act, therefore, is to nullify the hot cargo clause.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not proscribe union appeals to secondary
employers to engage in a boycott, whether or not the employer's labor
contract contains a hot cargo clause; and the secondary employer may
acquiesce in or resist the union's request with impunity, whether or
not his labor contract contains a hot cargo clause.
In 4ummary, authority and persuasive argument is available in sup-
port of or denial of each of the three positions which have been taken
regarding the hot cargo-secondary boycott problem. The task of the
Supreme Court is, in a legal sense, a difficult one of interpretation.
Economically, the effect of its decision will be to grant or deny to
organized labor an important and powerful weapon.(0 It is submitted
that the Court should not adopt the rationale that the clause is valid
but may not be invoked by direct appeal to secondary employees. The
effect of such a decision would be to nullify the hot cargo clause, but
this effect would be cloaked by the meaningless declaration that the
clause is nonetheless "valid." Either to uphold the view expressed in
the Conway's Express case, permitting secondary boycotts to be ef-
fected under a hot cargo clause, or to strike down the clause" as
repugnant to the public policy expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act,
would servexto clarify the positions of labor and management, replac-
ing confusion with certainty in present labor relations. In either
event, a decision which is clear in defining the result obtained would
offer Congress the opportunity to express national policy clearly.
59. In Truck Drivers Union, AFL-CIO, 41 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1087 (119 N.L.R.B.
No. 53) (Nov. 8, 1957) (Genuine Parts Co. case), the secondary employees, when
asked the reason for their refusal to handle the boycotted goods, uniformly stated:
"I personally refuse to handle." The Board looked beyond these pat replies, and
found that the union had committed an unfair labor practice in inducing the
employees to boycott.
60. It should be noted that, with one exception, all of the hot cargo cases involve
either the Teamsters Union or the Carpenters and Woodworkers Unions. Of
these, the great majority involve Teamsters Union contracts. The exception is
the American Iron and Machine Works Co. case, which also involves the Ma-
chinists Union, the union representing the primary employees. See note 39 supra.
Thus a decision which would, in effect, permit unions to institute boycotts under
the protection of a hot cargo clause would primarily benefit the Teamsters Union.
61. See 26 Fordham L. Rev. 522, 527 (1957).
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